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Critical Congress Stalls Foreign Policy Bills

WASHINGTON—Congress in 1950 has exhibited latent dissatisfaction with the Administration's foreign policy by criticizing and dawdling over bills and resolutions which the Administration considers important sources of strength for the United States in dealing with world affairs. Discontent is also shown by the recommendations some Congressmen have made that President Truman confer with Soviet Premier Stalin in order to settle outstanding American-Russian issues.

Secretary Acheson's Analysis

Apparently concerned lest the Congressional attitude harm the United States abroad, Secretary of State Dean Acheson has decided to give a number of public addresses in coming weeks, and the State Department on March 9 released a talk Mr. Acheson had given on February 16 to the Advertising Council at its annual meeting at the White House. In this talk the Secretary of State took the position that the conflict between the two great powers is profound and cannot be settled through conference because the Soviet government will make firm agreements only when confronted with unyielding strength, not when approached in a friendly spirit. The United States, he said, is engaged in a "crucial" struggle against communism and could lose the struggle without the firing of a shot. In order to win, the United States must parry Soviet expansionist thrusts (as it did with the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey and with the Marshall Plan in western and southern Europe) and strengthen the areas which lie outside the pro-Russian Communist orbit.

Yet the Secretary has not made it clear how the United States is to strengthen the non-Soviet areas abroad to our advantage. Some anti-Communist nations, such as India, seem unwilling to take a stand with this country against the Soviet Union. Other nations pose an ideological problem for the United States in that their governments oppose communism yet are in effect dictatorships, such as Spain.

On the one hand, Mr. Acheson contended that the United States must work closely with all nations willing to oppose the advance of Communist influence, no matter whether or not those nations fit our concept of democracy. On the other hand, he suggested that democracy is the real source of strength when he recommended that throughout the world the United States build up those economic, political, social and psychological conditions that strengthen and create confidence in the democratic way of life. It is impossible to conclude from those remarks whether the Secretary of State believes that the United States should follow a policy aimed simply at barricading the expansion of Russia's influence or a policy designed to eradicate those abuses in society and government which are potentially a source of strength for communism and of injury to ourselves.

Congressional Inactivity

To judge by the legislative record of the second session of the Eighty-first Congress, the Administration has failed to convince the Senate and House that the foreign policy bills introduced at the Capitol under Administration auspices will strengthen the

United States. So far only one bill has become law—aid to Korea and Formosa, enacted on February 14. The House has accepted the bill liberalizing the Displaced Persons Act, but the Senate is still debating it. There is a good possibility that the Senate will approve a liberal DP bill within a month. Neither the Senate Foreign Relations Committee nor the House Foreign Affairs Committee has even held hearings on the resolution providing for United States ratification of the proposed charter for the International Trade Organization. Congress has ignored messages received from the State Department more than a year ago asking for legislation that would make it possible for the Administration to augment its representation at the United Nations.

Even the implementation of noncontroversial international treaties has proved difficult. The Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees have pending on their calendars a series of fisheries bills of interest to the Administration—to give effect to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, signed February 8, 1949, and to implement the conventions for the Establishment of an International Commission for the Scientific Investigation of Tuna (signed on January 25, 1949) and the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (signed May 31, 1949).

The three bills most obviously calculated to strengthen the non-Soviet world—the second renewal of the Foreign Assistance Act and the two bills that would make possible the inauguration of Point Four—have an uncertain future. While

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the Senate and House committees on foreign affairs have begun their hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act renewal, the Senate Committee's Chairman Tom Connally on March 10 announced that he would offer an amendment to the renewal bill which would deny further Marshall Plan aid to Britain until the British government ceased to restrict the sale of American oil in Britain and in sterling area countries. Senator Connally's attitude does not mean that Congress will not enact the renewal bill, but it does open the way for an airing in Congress of many facets of dissatisfaction with the economic as well as political policies of countries receiving Marshall Plan assistance.

Point Four

Fourteen months after President Truman announced a "bold, new" step in foreign policy—the Point Four program for building up underdeveloped countries

—Congress has yet to enact either of the Point Four bills. One—the Kee-Herter bill entitled the "International Economic Development Act of 1950"—represents a compromise between the views of the Administration and some Republican representatives and would authorize the United States to spend the modest amount of \$45 million for the first year to finance technical assistance to underdeveloped countries—through the United Nations where practicable, otherwise through United States bilateral projects. (The State Department estimates that not more than \$85 million, in all currencies, could be effectively spent in one year on this type of program.) The \$45 million figure represents the highest amount which the State Department thinks the United States can contribute to a UN technical cooperation program without jeopardizing the program's international character. The bill will probably pass but Congress may try to attach amendments limiting the extent to

which these funds can be contributed to UN programs.

The second bill would authorize the Export-Import Bank to insure American capital against certain risks peculiar to foreign investment—expropriation of the investors' property without prompt and adequate compensation and inability to convert local currency derived from the investment into United States dollars. The Banking and Currency Committees of each house reported this bill favorably in 1949, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported the Kee-Herter bill on February 21. Since neither Senate nor House has scheduled debate on the bills and Communist pressure on Southeast Asia continues, the Administration may have to look for some other source of strength to supplement Point Four if it hopes to take immediate action to keep that underdeveloped area from falling under Communist control.

BLAIR BOLLES

India-Pakistan Tensions Focus on Kashmir

While world attention is focused on relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the United Nations Security Council, with Russia absent as a result of its "walk-out" in January, has been striving to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir issue. On March 7 it was announced that India and Pakistan had agreed in principle to the appointment of a mediator, as proposed by the United States, Britain, Cuba and Norway. The mediator would take over the job of the United Nations Commission now working on this problem and try to pave the way for a plebiscite by demilitarization of Kashmir.

At first glance the Kashmir dispute appears to be a contest between two neighboring but unneighborly countries over possession of an area of undoubted scenic charm, considerable potential resources and high strategic value by nineteenth-century standards. For India and Pakistan, however, this is primarily an ideological conflict rooted in the bitter communal rivalry between Hindus and Muslims which led to the creation of the two separate states in 1947 and still fans the flame of patriotism, particularly in Pakistan.

Two and a half years after their assumption of independence, the new nations are at odds over mistreatment of religious minorities, property rights of refugees, control of irrigation channels, currency de-

valuation and rupture of commercial relations. Each is devoting at least half of its annual budget to military expenditures aimed at the other. A settlement of the Kashmir issue would not of itself create good relations between India and Pakistan overnight, but it would certainly relieve some of the existing tension.

American official and unofficial spokesmen, concerned both with the preservation of peace in general and with the development of a stable non-Soviet area in Asia in particular, have repeatedly urged India and Pakistan to compose their differences over Kashmir. But Indians do not take kindly to this American pressure for a speedy compromise, since for them the question involves a fundamental principle.

Both Sides of the Story

The population of the princely state of Kashmir is overwhelmingly Muslim, but its ruler, His Highness Sir Hari Singh Bahadur, is a Hindu. Under pressure to choose between India and Pakistan at the time of partition, the Maharajah at first temporized. On October 26, 1947, as busloads of armed tribesmen poured across the Pakistan-Kashmir border and raced up the central highway of Kashmir to the outskirts of Srinagar, he acceded hastily to India. Indian troops were landed at the Srinagar airport the next day, and the tide of invasion was quickly turned. Kashmir

administration was taken over by a new Premier, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, who had led a fifteen-year popular struggle for elementary civil rights and representative government against the Maharajah's autocratic regime. Meanwhile, an insurgent Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government was set up over the southern and western districts adjoining the Pakistan border; in addition, a Pakistan Political Agent exercised power in the far northern area of Gilgit.

The Pakistani government held that Kashmir's accession to India was accomplished by fraud and refused to acknowledge it. Kashmir, it contended, belongs to Pakistan on grounds of geography, economics, military security and, above all, religion. It pointed out that Kashmir's normal all-weather communications run through Pakistan, that its only rail connections are with Pakistan and that its three rivers flow into Pakistan. The headworks of important Pakistani canal systems, moreover, lie in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir, Karachi claims, would vote overwhelmingly for union with Pakistan if given a fair chance to express their opinions.

India, according to its official spokesmen, was and is perfectly willing to hold a popular vote in Kashmir and, in fact, made its acceptance of the original accession conditional on consultation of the

will of the people of Kashmir. The New Delhi government, however, insists that no plebiscite can be held until all Pakistani invaders have been cleared from the state and normal conditions restored. From the Indian point of view, Pakistan's participation in the initial tribal invasion and subsequent wholesale military support of the Azad (Free Kashmir) cause amounts to naked aggression and deprives Pakistan of any legitimate voice in Kashmir affairs.

India's Complaint to the UN

In January 1948, India complained against Pakistan's conduct in Kashmir to the United Nations. Sir Mohammed Zaf-rullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, put up a brilliant, if hardly factual, defense, which Philip Noel-Baker, Britain's Commonwealth Secretary, promptly seconded. To India's dismay, the United States followed the British lead, and the Security Council proceeded to consider means of determining the future of Kashmir in a manner acceptable to Pakistan as well as to India. The Council finally passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of troops on both sides preliminary to the holding of an internationally supervised plebiscite.

When a five-member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, charged with implementing the resolution, arrived on the scene in July 1948, it found that three brigades of regular Pakistani troops had been sent into Kashmir in the previous May on the recommendation of General Sir Douglas E. Gracey, a British officer then and still serving as Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army.

By January 1, 1949, when the UN Commission succeeded in obtaining an informal preliminary cease-fire, the military situation amounted to an undeclared local war between India and Pakistan, involving tens of thousands of regular troops on both sides. The thin margin of agreement on which the cease-fire rested was that Kashmir should be demilitarized by the withdrawal of the whole of the Pakistani forces and the bulk of the Indian forces; that administration of the areas now controlled by the Azad government should remain temporarily in the hands of local authorities; and that as soon as peace and order had been restored, a "fair and impartial" plebiscite should be held under the supervision of a United Nations appointee.

The Indian and Pakistani interpretations of those terms, however, differed

greatly from the outset, and the area of disagreement has been steadily widening. Pakistani political leaders speak openly of their determination to liberate Kashmir "through plebiscite or war." Sheikh Abdullah talks in terms of a popular vote not to choose between India and Pakistan but "to ratify or not to ratify the accession."

Within Kashmir the areas held by the two armies have been virtually incorporated into the economic and political structure of the respective countries. The Azad territories are administered from a headquarters in Rawalpindi, Punjab province, Pakistan. Delegates from Kashmir were seated in the recent Indian Constituent Assembly. The three chief issues in the most recent negotiations involve (1) the disposal of the Azad forces which now number thirty-two well-armed battalions (over 30,000 men), (2) the timetable for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani regular forces from Kashmir, and (3) the defense and administration of the northern area which is now directly under Pakistani rather than Azad control.

In December 1949 the Commission reported to the Security Council that it was unable to arrange a formal truce and recommended its own replacement by a single individual with flexible terms of reference. Informal mediation by General Andrew G. L. McNaughton, Canada, then chairman of the Security Council, broke down by the middle of January 1950. Others who have been mentioned as possible mediators include Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, General Carlos P. Romulo and Dr. Ralph J. Bunche. At the end of February the United States and Britain proposed a resolution demanding that In-

dia and Pakistan both withdraw their troops from Kashmir within the next five months. After India and Pakistan have presented their reactions, the Security Council will vote on this motion.

Opinion in Kashmir

If a plebiscite were actually held, for whom would the people of Kashmir vote? There is little doubt that the 100-per-cent-Muslim Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad districts now under Pakistan control would opt for Pakistan, as would Gilgit and the other sparsely settled mountainous areas of the north. Similarly, the Hindus and Sikhs who now predominate in Jammu would almost certainly choose India, and so would the small numbers of Buddhists in the remote Ladakh region bordering Tibet. The real decision, however, would rest with the Kashmiris of the Vale, almost 90 per cent of whom are Muslims. Cool-headed foreign observers predict that there the vote would depend mainly on the degree of economic prosperity achieved under Abdullah's administration at the time of the balloting.

Frequent suggestions have been made, from October 1947 to the present, particularly in the British press, that the state be partitioned on religious lines or simply on lines of *de facto* occupation. Such proposals have been repudiated indignantly by all parties to the dispute but should not be ruled out as a last-minute move by either side.

ALICE THORNER

(Alice Thorner, co-author of the section on India and Pakistan in *Most of the World*, edited by Ralph Linton and published by the Columbia University Press in 1949, has contributed articles on Kashmir to several periodicals.)

Helen Howell Moorhead

The death on March 6 of Mrs. Helen Howell Moorhead is a sad loss to the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association, of which she had been a member since 1928, and to her many FPA friends. The Research Department, in whose work she always took a deep interest, will particularly miss her as a colleague and as a friend.

Mrs. Moorhead, a graduate of Bryn Mawr, began her studies of the international narcotics problem in the Foreign Policy Association in 1923. Out of these studies developed the research work of the Association, directed first by Edward Mead Earle, now a member of the Princeton University faculty; then, from 1927 to

1938, by Raymond Leslie Buell, whom Mrs. Moorhead introduced to the FPA; and since 1938 by Vera Micheles Dean. After serving as assistant to the Research Director in 1927 and 1928, Mrs. Moorhead became chairman of the FPA Opium Research Committee. Beginning in 1923 she represented the Association at sessions of the Opium Advisory Committee of the League of Nations in Geneva. Following World War II she attended the sessions of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations. She was the author of a *Foreign Policy Report*, "International Narcotics Control: 1939-1946," published in 1946, and contributed articles on this problem to the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN.

News in the Making

Mrs. Moorhead was one of the few persons in the world with a thorough knowledge of the international control of narcotic drugs. Her penetrating studies in this field commanded the respect of technical experts, and she never flagged in her endeavors to bring about understanding between nations with respect to drug control. To members of the Research Department she was a warm-hearted friend, quick to sense the problems of research, ever ready to see all sides of controversial issues and eager to offer constructive suggestions. Successful in her own field, she was generous in her appreciation of other women's accomplishments in international affairs. Liberalism based not on sentiment, but on factual knowledge, was for her a way of life as well as a profession of faith. Throughout her long and helpful connection with the Board and staff of the Foreign Policy Association she contributed richly to the Association's achievements.

Branches and Affiliates

*BOSTON, March 20, *Life and Death in the Far East*, Jacques M. May

*RHODE ISLAND, March 23-30, *World Affairs Week*, James P. Warburg, Mabel Head, Devere Allen, Edwin H. Canham, Theodore Paulin, Carl J. Friedrich, Count N. Rochefort, Mrs. Lakshmi Nandan Menon, The Honorable M. A. H. Ispahani, The Honorable G. C. S. Corea, Norman Cousins, The Honorable Sir Carl Berendsen

*BUFFALO, March 25, *Model General Assembly*, high-school students

*BETHLEHEM, March 24, *The Nuremberg Trials*, Eugene Miller, Samuel M. Hesson, and film

*WORCESTER, March 27, *Arming Western Europe*, John Scott

*UTICA, March 28, *South America, Continent in Crisis*, Ray Josephs

*COLUMBUS, March 29, *Washington Views the World*, Blair Bolles

*PITTSBURGH, March 29, *Behind U.S. Foreign Policy*, James B. Reston

*Data taken from printed announcement.

No Cause for Alarm, by Virginia Cowles. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949. \$3.75.

An American newspaperwoman, married to a Labor M.P., has written a sprightly, informed and sympathetic account of present-day Britain and its Labor government. The more technical economic complexities may be slighted, but the political picture is clearly and entertainingly drawn.

TOO LITTLE AND—? : Communist attempts to increase their influence among Italian peasants by leadership in the movement for the division of large estates have finally stirred the government to limited action. The Senate on March 10 approved a government bill which would authorize purchase of land holdings in excess of 750 acres in the Sila region of Calabria—the toe of Italy's boot. This land would be divided into lots of about 12½ acres, improved and sold to landless peasants on an installment basis. Meanwhile, Pope Pius XII in an encyclical letter, *Anni Sacri* (Holy Year), of March 11 referred indirectly to this situation when he stated that those who "excite the masses and provoke revolts" should understand that justice is reached by the "application of right" rather than by "force and violence." The Sila bill, which represents the legal approach to the problem, has yet to pass the Chamber of Deputies and falls far short of the prompt and extensive action which the situation requires.

AUSTRALIA STEPS OUT: A bid for Pacific leadership and for closer relations with the United States was made by Percy C. Spender, Australian Minister of External Affairs, before the House of Representatives in Canberra March 9. He said that his government was considering the possibility of a trade treaty with Washington and hoped to stimulate the flow of American capital for Australian development, as well as to other parts of Southeast Asia. He also spoke of a Pacific pact which would have positive social as well as defensive aims and would include the United States among its members.

UNREST IN THE MAGHREB: Although the West hears little of portions of the Muslim world still under European control—Tunisia, Algeria, and French and Spanish Morocco—nationalist sentiment there is strong, and as the independence of Libya in 1952 approaches, pressure for more rapid progress will increase. In an interview with *New York Times* correspondent C. L. Sulzberger on March 12, Abd el Krim, President of the National Liberation Committee of North Africans and leader of the Riff insurrection between

1922 and 1926, stated that the population of this region was prepared to rise in violent revolt if independence was not quickly granted. Stressing his opposition to communism, he nevertheless indicated that in an emergency his followers would accept aid from any quarter, even from the Soviet Union.

PRESSURE ON BRITAIN: ECA Administrator Paul G. Hoffman's proposal that \$150 million of Britain's tentative ERP allocation of \$687 million be placed in the new European Payments Union whether Britain joins or not indicates a stiffening of Washington's often-repeated stand on the need for integration of Western Europe. A statement by a British Treasury official on March 13 indicates Britain's unqualified intention to participate in the payments union.

CENTER CABINET FOR GREECE?: When the new Greek Parliament elected on March 5 assembles on March 30, King Paul will have before him a memorandum from the three center and left of center parties—General Nicholas Plastiras' National Progressives (Left Liberals), Sophocles Venizelos' Liberals and George Papan-dreou's Democratic Socialists—recommending the formation of a three-party government with General Plastiras as Premier. In the March 5 elections these three parties together won at least 130 seats of the 250 in the Chamber of Deputies. The proposed coalition could thus prevent the return to power by the conservative Populist party of former premier Constantin Tsaldaris. While General Plastiras has been accused at various times of being pro-German and pro-Communist, he and the leaders of the other two cooperating parties, in a joint declaration of March 12, have stated that Greece's place is definitely with the Western democracies to which the country owes the "preservation of her national independence." At the same time the declaration stressed Greece's desire for peace, "particularly with her neighbors," the Communist-led states to the north. At home the coalition proposes to balance the national budget, prevent waste of public moneys and assure wider social justice.

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